by Akin Osuntokun

The first prescribed order of business for this column today is to get readers familiarised with the meaning and usage of the word revanchist. According to the free encyclopaedia ‘Revanchism (from the French root word revanche-revenge) is a term used since the 1870s to describe a political manifestation of the will to reverse territorial losses incurred by a country, often following a war or social movement’.

Prior to paying closer scrutiny, I used to think that its usage was mainly applied to characterise an internationally aggressive behaviour that was said to be typical of the Germans. This I think was the perception of Germany that crystallised from the two World wars – especially the Second World War – where the desire to redeem her honour from the humiliation she suffered (including loss of vital territories) – under the imposition of the Treaty of Versailles, escalated to a full blown ambition to dominate the World. Little did I know that its origin is more French than German and was rooted in France’s obsessive desire to recover an iconic territory (Alsace-Lorraine) that was lost in the Franco-Prussia war of 1870.

Beyond these specific connotations and in general terms, revanchism may be understood as aggressive post-war behaviour of defeated protagonists seeking to redress or upturn terms of settlement they considered unjust and ill deserved.

The historical experience of the Igbo in Nigeria is unique. Unlike the other pre-colonial societies that were amalgamated to form the Nigerian colony, it had no prior comparable consolidated structures of elaborate system of governance as was, for instance, the case with the feudal monarchical governance authorities of the Oyo empire and the Sokoto caliphate.

It is a moot point whether this contrast adequately explains the perception of the Igbo as more socially individualistic and politically republican than other Nigerians. This disparity was further brought to light in the employment and application of the indirect rule administrative policy of the British colonialists in the governance of the Nigeria colony.

The indirect rule model was predicated on the adoption and adaptation of the extant mode of traditional governance as instrument and agent of colonial administration. On account of the well-organised pre-existing traditional governance framework in the North and Western provinces, the model worked as intended in those provinces and for the equivalent reason of the lack of comparable traditional institution, it failed in the East.

And here marks the beginning of the stress and superficiality of incorporating Nigeria as one political entity. To make the East conformable to the indirect rule model, the institution of warrant chiefs was created and imposed on the region with poor result.
As colonialism proceeded apace and with common exposure to Christian missionary proselytism and the logic of liberal secular education as social leveller, the Southern protectorate comprising the Yoruba, Igbo and the minority national groups were acculturated and incorporated into the same social and political orientation and vision of modern society.

The fact that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was for many years more popular in Lagos and most urban centres in Yoruba land than any Yoruba politician was an indication of how far the common Western acculturation had integrated Southern Nigeria.

This integration notwithstanding, it is possible to isolate certain anecdotal Igbo traits. Before I go any further on this provocative mission I duly crave the indulgence of Ndigbo to make the following pronouncements; they tend to be forceful, determined and aggressive in the pursuit of goals and objectives; they are the most mobile and adventurous of all national groups comprising Nigeria; they can be domineering, brash and are prone to easily offend the sensibilities of others; they are industrious, ambitious, rash and can get easily roused to take recourse to fisticuffs or war.

In the light of these general assumptions, what instances can we then cite as typical manifestations of these traits? Random examples include the self-regarding boast that Igbo domination of Nigeria (or is it Africa) is a matter of time; the abortive attempt by the leader of the NCNC, Azikiwe to become the Premier of the Western region in 1951; a streak of self-aggrandising behaviour in the post-independence NPC/NCNC alliance at the federal government level; the January 15th 1966 coup; Ironsi’s political bluster; and of course, the Aburi accord mismanagement and the descent into the civil war.

Left on their own, unencumbered by forceful co-optation into Nigeria, the chances are that they would have made a spectacular success of a hypothetical Ndigbo nation. To a higher or lesser degree, similar potential can be attributed to most sub-national ethnic groups in Nigeria. The tragedy here is that incorporation into Nigeria has tended to diminish rather than enhance the potential for success of the amalgamated sub-national groups.

Within Nigeria’s dysfunctional context-marked by such lapses as lack of positive correlation between productivity and reward; the deliberate subordination and sacrifice of meritocracy to the politics of coerced national integration-otherwise positive traits and impulses were debased and commandeered to serve the cause of group survival and nepotism.

In sheer capacity for hubris, the analogy can be safely made that what the Germans are to Europe, the Igbos are to Nigeria. And like the Germans before them, they were fated to get into trouble in the Nigeria family of nations. It started with the tension generated by the post-independence political alliance between the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) and the Eastern region dominated National council of Nigeria citizens (NCNC) – which pitted the South-west in opposition and outside the loop of preferential treatment in sharing out the patronage and pork domiciled with the federal government.

The principal component of the tension was the complaint of marginalisation by the South-west political elite relative to the perceived over-compensation of their South-east counterparts in patronage and appointments. The argument over the need to redress this complaint ultimately resulted in the breakaway of Premier Ladoke Akintola of the Western region from the Obafemi Awolowo-led Action Group (AG); and movement into alliance with the NPC-controlled federal government.

In view of the precipitate backdrop of the degenerate political situation in the country, the coup of January 1966 cannot be said to be entirely without justification. However, the imperfections of the coup as reflected in the composition of the ringleaders and the regional lop-sidedness of the victims gave sufficient room for suspicion of regional agenda. The fact that the inheritor of the power vacuum-fostered by the abortive coup was General JTU Aguiyi Ironsi (Igbo) did nothing to allay the fears and suspicion generated by the coup.

The deadly riposte that ensued from July 1966 all through to the end of the civil war in 1970 was the stuff of complete national subjugation of Ndigbo – as she lied prostrate and helpless before the victorious Nigerian allies. Smarting from this tragic experience, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the injury suffered therefrom has been assuaged; and until a fellow Nigerian of Igbo origin becomes the president of Nigeria, they may not consider themselves as fully reconciled with Nigeria.

Notwithstanding the vice-presidency of Dr. Alex Ekwueme and the Awolowo personified opposition platform of the South-west, the reality was that post-civil war Nigeria was largely the playground of the allies-until the emergence of Dr Goodluck Jonathan as President of Nigeria. There are several power politics interpretations of the Jonathan presidency. One is that it is a government of the minorities-that it is constructed on the alliance and sustenance of the Northern and Southern minorities. Second is that it is an Ijaw/Niger Delta affair. Another is that it is dominated by the Igbo.

One way to look at these characterisations is to see it as reflecting a Nigerian mentality that is not yet accustomed to the notion that new guys have arrived at the central scene of power politics. Certainly there is a dimension of the criticism of Jonathan that derives from the resentment of the Nigerian traditional power wielders against the newcomers.

In equal and opposite measure, the newcomers have chosen to call the bluff of the old Nigerian hegemonic bloc. And in this attitude they are aided by the veto power that the Niger Delta wields over the Nigerian economy.

An observation that should not warrant any argument is that Ndigbo has demonstrated a sense of ownership of the Jonathan government in a manner it has not related to any federal government since 1966. Following the thesis of the eminent Russian psychoanalyst Ivan Pavlov, this identification is, first, in response to the special love and attention it has received from the president; and then it could also result from the sentiment of regional solidarity-hacking back to the defunct Eastern region which straddle the territory now comprising the South-south and South-east zones.

A similar sweetheart cosy intimacy cannot be inferred from the president’s relationship with the South-west. This lukewarm relationship status cannot be said to be of Jonathan’s making or desire. No president seeking re-election in the prevailing political circumstances can afford the liability of this perception.

The relationship gap was created by circumstances beyond his control. One such circumstance was the tragicomedy drama that recently climaxed with the long anticipated defection of Speaker Aminu Tambuwal to the APC. Tambuwal became the Speaker of the House of Representatives through a spectacular display of uncommon opportunism and treacherous conspiracy with a Yoruba-based political party that, for no good reason, decided to sell its own people for short. Thus the momentum for the political deprivation the South-west was let loose.

Since 1951, there has been a ding dong tendency for both the South-east and the South-west to blame one another for their political failure and marginalisation at the federal government level. The former felt betrayed by the position the latter took over the civil war-to join in the fight against them rather than make common purpose with them. Many years after, the South-east found a good opportunity to pay back in what appeared to be a regional mainstream position to shun solidarity with the cause of President-elect Moshood Abiola in the annulment of the 1993 presidential election crisis.

Revanchism is rather too strong to characterise the assertive ownership mentality of Ndigbo in this dispensation but there are people who have argued that Ndigbo carries something similar in her DNA. My mission here is to clarify some of the issues in the hope of helping to foster a balanced perspective.

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Op-ed pieces and contributions are the opinions of the writers only and do not represent the opinions of Y!/YNaija.