by Alexander O. Onukuwe
The dust will not settle anytime soon on the matter of Firdaus Amasa not being called to the bar due to her hijab.
The Sultan of Sokoto, through a representative, has weighed in on the issue as a denial of Firdaus’ religious liberty. Femi Fani-Kayode responded to the Sultan in no sugar-coated terms about channelling his energy towards fighting girl child marriage and paedophilia. The Nigerian Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) then released a statement signed by Prof Salihu Shehu. He described the treatment of Ms Amasa as indicative of the intolerance, bigotry and conspiratorial tendency of Christians who occupy the rule-drafting echelons of the anachronistic Nigerian legal system.
The NSCIA’s statement did not limit itself to the present matter but took the opportunity to bawl about past instances of perceived oppression against Muslims. It cited supposed infringements on Friday prayers, lack of freedom to build mosques in the South and “imbalance against Islam” in the appointments of President Buhari. The statement does not stop short of stating that preventing Firdaus from donning her hijab the way she wants is islamophobic and an act of hate.
Now, the matter has been raised on the floor of the House of Representatives on the motion of a Rep who believes the Constitution guarantees the lady in question to dress how so ever she likes. It just might happen that Ms Amasa’s civil disobedience may be the scripting of a new chapter on the power of the citizen to effect change in the country.
But far from being a throwback to Rosa Parks, the arguments for Ms Amasa’s hijab is another indication of our double standards, of a people motivated by self-interests in conversations about public policy.
It is not possible to read the NSCIA’s statement without appreciating the smack of entitlement and lack of objectivity in the analysis of so-called imbalance or oppression towards Muslims in Nigeria. It tries to point to the appearance of smoke from a building as evidence of fire when it is only the morning haze of harmattan. The case of Firdaus’ hijab does not necessitate the strong words of the NSCIA’s statement and as far as claims of marginalisation go, it is not novel to see any religious or ethnic group in Nigeria portray itself as behind on the queue of favours. Prof Shehu’s brawly words are no more forceful than can be written by persons of other religions in the country, whose freedoms, rights and privileges have been affected by the beliefs and practices of Islam.
Some Christian corps members serving in majority Muslim states have stories of restrictions placed on the number of religious activities they can organise during the period of their orientations, but it does not trend on Twitter nor make Network News. We hear of non-Muslim persons who are attacked for eating during Ramadan, as though they were supposed to participate in the fast by virtue of their residence in Muslim-majority parts of the country.
Then, we remember the episode of fifteen years ago, when the deputy Governor of Zamfara, Mahmuda Aliyu Shinkafi, declared that the blood of Isioma Daniel could be shed by all Muslims anywhere as a religious duty. Why? Because 21-year old Isioma dared to have an opinion about a religious figure. As irreverent as her article may have been, it was still a hypothetical opinion shared under a democratic setting in a “secular” state. The fatwa against Ms Daniel apparently still holds today and that is why the then ThisDay journalist has never returned to the country. She is bound to live out the rest of her days in obscurity for fear of being hunted down and killed. Nobody is fighting her cause to be reintegrated into society on the basis of the 1999 Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of thought; is that not a clear case of one’s fundamental right being denied?
But let’s come back to the present day, and see if the privilege of freedom now being propagated for Firdaus will be granted to all persons whose rights are guaranteed by the Constitution. What should we now expect with regard to the rules that bind students on many of the nation’s campuses to participate in certain religious activities, some of which are against their faith? Are we now going to mandate those schools to change their rules? More in line with the Firdaus’ matter, what are we now going to determine as appropriate or inappropriate in terms of dress codes on campuses? Surely we are now going to dispense with all of those because the Constitution guarantees everyone freedom to dress as they like? Are we going to also talk about the fact that the Gender and Equal Opportunities Bill was thrown out of the National Assembly because of the sentiments expressed against it motivated by Islamic teachings?
And what about the law that criminalises certain sexual orientations, as unnatural and contrary to accepted norms as they may be; is it constitutional on the basis of freedom of thought and conscience?
Changing the law is not easy and should not be motivated by personal interests isolated from public consequences. As a society where heterogeneous persons are bound to live together, every proposition to go in a new direction must bear considerations for ripple effects on all. Where such effects are not fully known in the short term, the safe bet is to see reasons for maintaining the present status, for the common good. As far as the requirement for the call to the bar dressing is concerned, there is nothing in it which specifically targets Muslims or persons of any other religion, when considered objectively. The wearing of the hijab is not banned in so far as the conditions for wearing it – i.e, the visibility of one’s facial features – are adhered to. Those who wish to defend the wearing of the outfit at all costs may want to ask why persons undergoing training at the camps of the para-military organisations in the country do not also wear theirs during their training.
If what we want is a society where anything goes, a libertarian-minded principle of public policy where there are no censorships, then we should be bold and not hide under religious pretensions. But knowing the conservatism of our society, libertarianism or egoism does not appear to be the desired ethical principle of public policy. Hence, there must be caution when throwing fits of temper objecting to defined codes of public conduct which clearly do not target specific beliefs or groups.
The Council for Legal Education, as a public body, has the duty to create an environment where everyone is included and free. However, there is a reason public policy is defined as what government chooses to do or not to do. Determining the guiding principles for the choice of action inevitably exposes our double standards and personal interests, but at any time when rule changes are advocated because of self-interests, the bigger picture and the consequences should always be in our minds.
