by Nnamdi Anekwe-Chive

Remember, the complexity of the order of battle of the north east, and the fact the military efforts were eroded by gross under equipment, lack of cooperation of neigbours made nonsense of whatever military efforts that were ongoing.

In any case, Boko Haram would go on with the insurgency, raiding communities, villages and local governments, while hoisting their flags. They were embedded within the population, making it extremely difficult for the Nigerian troops to isolate them.

[READ: Nnamdi Anekwe-Chive: Why the military are now taking the fight to Boko Haram (Part 1)]

All these happened between 2011 to 2012, and events were spiraling out of control until the president declared a partial state of emergency in the north east in December, 2012, and a full scale emergency in May 2013.

How did the military and security services fare under this phase (May 2013– December 2013)?

Under General Ihejirika, then chief of army staff, men and military hardware were moved to Borno state, Adamawa and Yobe, with a lightening offensive against the Boko Haram terrorists.

They were dislodged from their camps, sacked from the villages, their flags brought down, the camps in sambisa forest were raided as well, with the terrorists routed from every inch of the Nigerian territory, but there was a problem. They ran across the border to Chad, Niger and Cameroon, regrouped, rearmed, their ranks swelled with Tuareg fighters from northern Mali and the Sahel, including recruits from those neighboring countries.

They opened a new front in late 2013 with semi-conventional warfare and also the activation of urban cells for suicide bombings, including brutal raids on soft targets. During some of those encounters with the Nigerian state, the military suffered setbacks, and more so, the terrorists were not fighting conventionally, they were using anti-aircraft, improvised technicals, improvised explosive devices, and suicide trucks against the Nigerian soldiers.

What kind of military hardware would have been strategic to contain these attacks from the terrorists by the Nigerian army?

Going by what was at Boko Haram’s disposal, the Nigerian military needed dozens of mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, T72 armoured tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, assault helicopters, tansport planes, intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance capabilities e.t.c.

Do we have these equipment in late 2013 and Q1, Q2 & Q3 of 2014?

The Nigerian military have some of these capabilities, but they were clearly not sufficient and grossly inadequate, considering the order of battle previously explained for the North East.

Were there efforts to quickly bring in these equipment, in order to change the military calculations on the ground?

At this time, Col. Sambo Dasuki(rtd) is now the NSA, having being appointed in June 2013, shortly after the declaration of the state of emergency in the north east. He led the efforts to bring in equipment from the US, the Nigerian government wanted the Obama administration to provide them with equipment like MRAPs and Cobra helicopters, in order to use these to turn around the war.

The United States government turned down the request, citing human rights violations by our military. Nigeria quickly turned to other sources amidst tremendous challenges, including US’s blockage of arms deal with the Israelis.

Donald Rumsfeld, another former US defense secretary, was asked by a soldier why the US military had no certain capability to prosecute the war they were fighting at the time, he told the soldier that every nation goes to war with the army they have.

Same can be applied to Nigeria, because as at the time the Boko Haram terrorists commenced a new phase of campaign in 2014, it manifested clearly that the Nigerian state was fighting a war with the army at its disposal.

So how did it go with the nation and its military and political leadership under this phase January 2014-February 2015?)

President Jonathan reorganized the armed forces in January 2014, brought in Lt. General Minimah to replace Lt. Ihejirika as the chief of army staff, and also Air Marshal Alex Badeh as the chief of defense staff. They set out to confront the new phase with further training of special forces in Russia, including the US and Britain providing non lethal support in form of training too.

They presented an assessment to the president and the national assembly on what the military needs to contain the insurgency, and equally go on the offensive.

The federal government made attempts to contact Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, China, Russia and South Africa, for arms and ammunitions, assault helicopters, transport planes, mine resistant protected ambush vehicles, armoured tanks, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets such as drones and other capabilities.

While the government were scrambling to equip the military and get buy in of our neigbours for military/security cooperation, the Boko Haram were unrelenting, maiming soft targets, sacking villages, attacking military formations, and created a general sense of anarchy in the areas where they were operating, culminating in the kidnap of the Chibok girls that attracted global attention.

As the insurgency raged, it needs to be restated that the Nigerian military capability were not all useless, they fought off terrorists, defended towns, and generally held their own in some key fronts, but failure of equipment, inadequate strategy and tactics on the part of some commanders led major towns to fall, while they also suffered heavy casualties.

Remember, the complexity of the order of battle of the north east, and the fact the military efforts were eroded by gross under equipment, lack of cooperation of neigbours made nonsense of whatever military efforts that were ongoing.

Looking at what military needed to win in early 2014; a special forces brigade to be stationed in north east to aid the CT-COIN, hundreds of MRAPs and T70 tanks to aid troop advances against book haram deadly technical, mines and IEDS, with complements of adequate air support and ISR, cooperation from the three neigbouring countries to deny book haram sanctuaries, and more infantry and specialized battalions deployed, and other specialized military units.

Robert Gates, on getting to know that the US forces suffer heavy casualties while riding in Humvees against the Iraqi and Afghan insurgents, bypassed the pentagon bureaucracy, and rolled out first set of MRAPs within one year, which did a lot to save lives. The above provisions outlined for Nigeria military in early 2014, could not have taken nothing less than six to 12 months to be ready.

So it’s a disservice to Nigerian military to say they are currently engaging in the fight for political reasons, without appreciating the challenges that dotted the land scape, though with huge consequences for human lives.

It is on record the military stated in December 2014, that they would start military operations in February 2015, and chief of army staff, Lt. General Minimah at various fora, reiterated the army would go offensive as soon the military hardware arrived, and it needs not be repeated that Mr President held several security meetings with his team, and neigbouring countries late last year, all geared towards the big offensive in 2015.

————————

 

Op-ed pieces and contributions are the opinions of the writers only and do not represent the opinions of Y!/YNaija.