by Niyi Akinnaso

It is also important not to overlook the relative sophistication of Yoruba voters. Compared to other groups, they have a higher literacy rate and are more exposed to urban life. Finally, they are hard to deceive or cheat, which is why they often fought to the death to reclaim their stolen mandate.

From colonial times, the Yoruba territory of the South-West geopolitical zone, now comprising the six states of Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo, has always occupied three frontline positions in Nigerian history. First, the zone has always been in the forefront of urbanisation, boasting more urban centres than any other zone in the federation. Second, the South-West has always been the driver of the national economy. Although the bulk of the nation’s wealth now comes out of the oil-rich South-South, the South-West remains the financial hub of the nation. Third, from the early days of independence, the South-West has always been the battleground zone in presidential politics. Save for the unusual presidential election of 1999, in which former President Olusegun Obasanjo was the preferred candidate from the onset, no one has been elected Prime Minister or President without winning the South-West.

Given the way the electoral map is shaping up for the 2015 general election, the South-West again will be the swing zone in the presidential election. A conservative reading of the map gives the far or so-called core North (that is, much of the three northern zones) to Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress, while the South-South, the South-East, and part of the North-Central go to President Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples Democratic Party. If the strategic electoral value of the South-West led Olusegun Obasanjo to negotiate with zonal leaders in 2003 and President Jonathan to do the same in 2011, no serious presidential candidate can afford to do less in 2015.

True, Jonathan won five of the six states in the zone in 2011, the tide has since turned against him in favour of Buhari for at least three reasons. First, the South-West is the bastion of the APC in the South, with four of the six states in the zone being controlled by the party. Second, the National Leader of the APC, Bola Tinubu, and the party’s vice-presidential candidate, Yemi Osinbajo, are from the South-West. Third, the electoral mood of many voters in the zone favours “change” from the status quo, as revealed in various opinion polls.

In one of such polls, conducted just before the postponement of the elections, Buhari won all six states in the zone, despite the control of Ekiti and Ondo by the PDP and in spite of Jonathan’s popularity in both states. The fact that many voters are willing to vote for Buhari indicates that the desire for change trumps whatever baggage he might have brought to the ticket from his draconian style as a military leader 30 years ago. Whatever dirt is being thrown at him is either not sticking or is bouncing back.

The renewed effort to win over the South-West by Jonathan and the PDP, especially since the postponement of the presidential election from February 14 to March 28, 2015, must be understood against the above backgrounds. In the forefront of this effort is the Ondo State Governor, Dr. Olusegun Mimiko, who also is the Coordinator of the Jonathan Campaign Organisation in the South-West.

In addition to soliciting the support of traditional, religious, business, and youth leaders as well as market women from across the South-West, Yoruba elders, represented by the Afenifere, were singled out for their support, using the National Conference, which they supported, as the trump card. The remainder of this essay focuses on the PDP’s use of the National Conference in driving the presidential campaign in the South-West.

The central argument is that the support of the Afenifere elders for Jonathan’s re-election was needed if their contributions to the National Conference were to be rewarded through the implementation of its recommendations. The belief is that Jonathan, who convoked the conference against the staunch opposition of the APC leaders, was in a better position to implement its report and its recommendations.

At two major post-National Conference summits at Akure and Ibadan, the focus was on what the Yoruba nation would gain from the implementation of the conference recommendations. The gains are summed up in item 5 of the communique issued at the end of the Ibadan summit on February 26, 2015, as follows: “That other profound recommendations of the Confab particularly those that touch on devolution of powers, creation of state and community police services; making prisons service a concurrent matter; allowing each state to have its constitution; decentralisation of the powers over the establishment and management of railways, sea ports, airports and development of solid minerals are central to the core interests of the Yoruba.”

In hindsight, these gains are crucial to Yoruba integration, a project once vigorously pursued by the Action Congress of Nigeria before it became part of the APC. Understandably, the project was muted by the APC leaders in the South-West in order not to detract from their new party’s national outlook. Nevertheless, the APC’s opposition to the National Conference was a grave mistake because the conference’s 600 recommendations, all reached by consensus, indicate major gains for all six zones and every state within each zone, if fully implemented.

In fairness to Mimiko, no governor, or political leader for that matter, has devoted much time and resources to the National Conference. His strong belief in the implications of the conference recommendations for self-determination, true federalism, and good governance led him to arrange as many as six elaborate pre- and post-conference summits to prepare for, and reflect upon, the key recommendations of the conference. No wonder the Ondo delegation to the conference was acknowledged by conference participants as a star delegation. If Mimiko’s renewed focus on the conference report is now being viewed as a political stunt, the opposition to the conference by the APC South-West leaders could not be viewed differently, given their historical support for previous national conferences and the implications of the one they boycotted for Yoruba integration, a course they once pursued.

Be that as it may, it is fair to say that the implementation of the conference report hinges more on the National Assembly than on the President, because only the National Assembly could effect the necessary constitutional changes entailed in the report. If Jonathan were in a position to implement the report before the election, he would have done so, if only for its electoral value.

This was not lost on Mimiko, who ensured that the PDP candidates for the National Assembly were also present at the summits. Their charge is to take the campaign about the gains of the conference to their constituencies as only their own election could guarantee the implementation of the conference recommendations.

It is important, however, not to overlook the real problem with the electoral value of the National Conference as a campaign issue. It is an elite issue: The summits were held in elite settings for elite participants, some of whom do not even vote at all. As such, the issue has limited, if any, appeal to the masses, especially bread-and-butter voters, who are in the majority. These are voters who want to see and feel improvements in their life chances, such as steady power supply, good roads in their neighbourhoods, regular payment of their salaries, access to health care, and affordable quality education for their children.

It is also important not to overlook the relative sophistication of Yoruba voters. Compared to other groups, they have a higher literacy rate and are more exposed to urban life. Finally, they are hard to deceive or cheat, which is why they often fought to the death to reclaim their stolen mandate. At the same time, however, speaking the same language does not necessarily make them a homogenous group, especially on political and other sensitive issues. This is especially true of Yoruba elders and traditional rulers. Any campaign that ignores these facts does so at its own peril.

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